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CONDITIONS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT'
ARTH R L. CORBiN
Professor of Law, Yale University
In order to understand any legal system it is necessary to consider
the purely physical facts of life apart from the legal relations that
are consequent upon such facts. Legal relations are merely mental
concepts which are useful in enabling us to foresee the physical facts
of the future. Disregarding the multitudes of facts that have no
effect whatever upon existing legal relations, those that remain-the
operative facts-must be considered and classified. In any case, the
best method of procedure is to consider each operative fact separately,
and in chronological order, and to determine the legal relations that
exist after such single fact.
Thus: Fact one: A says to B, "If you will agree to pay me $ioo
for this horse you may have him and you may indicate your agree-
ment by taking him." This is a physical fact, called an offer, con-
sisting of certain muscular acts of A (his spoken words) producing
certain physical effects in B. The legal relations immediately follow-
ing are (in part) as follows: B now has the privilege of taking the
horse and A has no-right that he shall not; B has the power of
making the horse his own by taking him, with the correlatiye liability
in A to the loss of his ownership; no new rights or duties are created
and no new immunities or disabilities; by giving B a privilege and
a power, A has lost a previous right and a previous immunity.
Fact two: B says to A, "How old is the horse?" This fact operates
to create no new legal relations whatever. The operative legal effect
of fact one is still intact.
Fact three: A, knowing the horse to be 12 years old, replies, "6
years." This false representation changes the character of B's power
by adding to it; he still has the power to make the horse his own by
accepting the offer, but now his acceptance will create in addition the
power to "rescind" on discovery of the fraud.
Fact four: B takes possession of the horse. This is the fact called
acceptance. It operates at once to create in B all those multitudinous
legal relations that are called "ownership" or "title" and to extin-
guish the ownership of A; also to create a right in A as against B
and the correlative duty in B to pay $ioo. Because of fact three, B
also has the power to restore the legal status quo by tendering the
horse back.
' Certain parts of this article were prepared for the writer's edition of Anson
on Contracts, soon to be published by the Oxford University Press.
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It is thus that each case should be analyzed and the legal relations
determined. Any fact that causes new legal relations to exist is an
operative fact. Any law book might properly be entitled, therefore,
the Legal Operation of Facts.
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS
The law of contract deals with those legal relations that arise
because of mutual expressions of assent. The parties have expressed
their intentions in words, or in other conduct that can be translated
into words. The notion is not at all uncommon that legal relations
called contractual cannot exist unless the parties intended them to
exist, and that the sole function of the courts, therefore, is one of
interpretation: What was the intention of the parties? This notion
is far from correct. In almost all cases of contract, legal relations
will exist, from the-very moment of acceptance, that one or both of
the parties never consciously expected would exist, and therefore
cannot be said to have intended. Furthermore, the life history of any
single contract may cover a long period of time, and new facts will
occur after acceptance of the offer-facts that may gravely affect
the existing legal relations and yet may have been utterly unfore-
seen by the parties. Many of these uncontemplated legal relations
are invariably described as contractual. Therefore it appears that a
necessary function of the courts is to determine the unintended legal
relations as well as the intended ones.&2
The first step in this judicial process is the merely historical one
of determining what the operative facts were. What did the parties
say and do? What words did they use? Did they execute a docu-
ment? This historical determination is made possible by evidence.
The next step is one of interpretation. In taking this step the
court may put to itself two questions: first, what was the actual
state of mind of the contracting parties, their meaning and intention
at the time they said the words or performed the other acts to be
interpreted; second, what meaning do the words and acts of the
parties now express to a reasonable and disinterested third party?
It is only in exceptional cases that these questions will be consciously
considered by a court; usually the process of interpretation will
involve rapid and unconscious shifts from the one aspect to the other.
'In Becker v. London Assur. Corp. (I918, H. L.) I17 L. T. Rep. 6og, constru-
ing an insurance contract, Lord Sumner said: "I dare say few assured have
any distinct view of their own on the point, and might not even see it, if it
were explained to them, but what they intend contractually does not depend on
what they understand individually. If it is impiicit in the nature of the bargain,
then they intend it in law just as much as if they said it in words."
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CONDITIONS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
Frequently the only way to arrive at an answer to the first question
is to answer the second; in other cases the two may both be sus-
ceptible of answer and the two answers may not agree. If the actual
intention of the parties is not the same as the meaning that is now
conveyed to a reasonable man," it is the latter that will more often
prevail. If, however, the parties clearly had a common meaning and
intention, it will control irrespective of what a third person would have
understood.
Often, however, the court cannot solve the problem before it by
mere interpretation. The court's problem is to determine the jural
relations of the parties as they are now; and these relations depend
upon facts, both contemporaneous with the acceptance and subsequent
thereto, which were not known or anticipated by the parties and as
to which they made no provision that is capable of either sort of
interpretation. The question now is, not what is the meaning of
words, but what does the welfare of society require in view of these
unknown or unanticipated circumstances. To answer this question
the court must resort to general rules of law even though they were
unknown by the parties, to rules of fairness and morality, to the pre-
vailing mores of the time and. place. This process may be called one
of judicial construction. The line separating mere interpretation from
judicial construction, although logically quite clear, will always be
practically indistinct and difficult of determination, especially because
the courts so frequently construct under the guise of mere
interpretation.
THE NATURE OF A RIGHT
One of the chief purposes for which parties make an executory
contract is the creation of rights and duties. A right is the logical
correlative of a duty; the one cannot exist without the other, and
neither can exist at all unless there are two individuals living within
some organized society.4 If for the benefit of A, society commands
certain conduct or performance on the part of B and will take some
action detrimental to B in case of disobedience, we say that A has a
right and B has a duty. Right required performance by another;
duty requires performance by its possessor.
'It is not intended to consider here either the many difficult problems arising
out of mistake or the exact operation of the "parol evidence rule."
' It is not uncommon for writers to describe certain rights as "absolute" rights;
but any so-called "absolute" right will be found on analysis to consist of a
multitude of single rights against a multitude of separate persons, each of whom
is under a correlative duty. These rights have been aptly described by Professor
W. N. Hohfeld as "multital" rights, as opposed to "unital" rights and "paucital"
rights. See Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1917) 26 Y= LAW JouRNAL,
710. It is not uncommon to speak of "inherent" rights and "natural" rights,
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CONDITIONS AND CONDITIONAL RIGHTS
Society may not command B to perform immediately, however;
nor may its command be absolute and -unconditional. Thus, if for
value received B promised A to pay him $Ioo one year after date,
the law recognizes the existence of a right in A and a duty in B, but
will take no steps by way of enforcement until the date of maturity.
A duty rests on B, but the performance that it requires is not to
take place until the end of the year. B's promise is said to be uncon-
ditional, although his duty is in fact conditional upon the passage
of a year's time-a condition whose non-occurrence is not conceivable
by the human mind and one which is therefore disregarded in
describing the promise and the duty.
Suppose, secondly, that B promises to pay the $IOO after his ship
comes in. Here the promise is a conditional promise, and it is not
at all certain that the condition (the coming in of the -ship) will occur.
It may be argued that until this operative fact called a condition
comes into existence there is no right and no duty whatever. It is
true that prior to its existence there will be no legal penalty for non-
action. But prior to its existence legal relations exist, and they are
commonly called conditional rights and conditional duties as opposed
to instantly enforceable rights and immediately active duties. No
absolute necessity is seen for proposing new descriptive terms; but
there is great necessity for understanding the character of the legal
relations before and after the actual occurrence of the condition. If
the conditioning fact is an act of one of the parties he may properly
be said to have a power to create instant rights and duties by doing
the act, and the other party is under a correlative liability.5 But many
conditioning facts are not acts of either party, and neither party has
a power. If the condition is the act of a third person, that person has
a power and each party to the contract is under a correlative liability.6
some even claiming "divine" rights; but these terms are used only by those
whose historical perspective is insufficient to enable them to perceive that all
such rights are dependent on the prevailing mores of society, changing as the
mores change in the onward course of our evolutionary development. See
William G. Sumner (19o6) Folkways; A. G. Keller (1915) Societal Evolution,
and especially Professor Keller's article in the present number of the JOURNAL
entitled Law in Evolution.
'Power and liability are adequate to describe the existing jural relations in
this case, but inveterate custom would also justify "conditional right" and
"coriditional duty." To the writer such a right and such a duty seem .to be iden-
tical with power and liability respectively. If they are not, then both pairs of
relations exist, and there is a power to turn the conditional right and duty into
instant ones, and a correlative liability in the other interested party.
'Thus if A agrees to be bound by contract with B subject to the approval of
C, A's duty to B is conditional upon the act of C. C has a power and A has a
liability. Thurnell v. Balbirnie (1837, Exch.),2 M. & W. 786; Pyr v. Campbell
(1856, K. B.) 6 E. -& B. 370.
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CONDITIONS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
If the condition is not the act of any person but is instead some other
fact of nature, no individual has a power.7 In such case we describe
the relations between the contracting parties as a conditional right and
a conditional duty.8
The word "condition" is used in the law of property as well as
in the law of contract and it is used with some variation in meaning.
In the law of contract it is sometimes used in a very loose sense as
synonymous with "term," "provision," or "clause." In such a sense
it performs no useful service; instead, it affords one more opportunity
for slovenly thinking. In its proper sense the word "condition"
means some operative fact subsequent to acceptance and prior to
discharge, a fact upon which the rights and duties of the parties
depend. Such a fact may be an act of one of the two contracting
parties, an act of a third party, or any other fact of our physical
world. It may be a performance that has been promised or a fact
as to which there is no promise.
It will be observed that any operative fact may with some propriety
be said to be a cause or condition of the legal relations that are con-
sequent thereon. This does not mean that these legal relations will
infallibly follow the existence of this fact irrespective of its combina-
tion with other antecedent facts; but it does mean that with the same
combination of antecedent facts legal relations will infallibly result.
An offer is a cause (or condition) of the power in the offeree. An
acceptance is a cause (or condition) of contractual rights and duties.
Nevertheless in contract law it is not common to speak of these facts
as conditions, although such usage is not unknown. The term condi-
tion is more properly restricted to facts subsequent to acceptance and
prior to discharge.
Express, implied and constructive conditions. A certain fact may
operate as a condition, because the parties intended that it should and
said so in words." It is then an express condition. It may operate as
"As where A agrees to be bound to B if a ship comes in, or if the subject
matter is not destroyed. Gray v. Gardner (1821) 17 Mass. 188; Taylor v. Cald-
well (1863, Q. B.) 3 B. & S. 826.
'Why should not each of these be described as a mere liability to a right or
to a duty? The term would not in itself be inappropriate, but such a use of
it would not be consistent with the usage that we have already adopted. A legal
relation is a relation between human individuals, not between human and divine
or between human and impersonal Nature. A liability is the relation of one per-
son to another person when that other possesses the power of changing their
legal relations to each other or to third persons by his own voluntary act. Since
in the present sort of case no person possesses a power, it seems best not to
make use of the term liability. "Conditional duty" serves the purpose well
enough and has no secondary signification. In view of the evils involved in the
"slippery" words of our present legal terminology, not a single step should be
taken toward double significations.
If they used words that are now interpreted by the court as creating a condi-
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a condition because the parties intended that it should, such intention
being reasonably inferable from conduct other than words. It is then
a condition implied in fact. Lastly, it may operate as a condition
because the court believes that the parties would have intended it to
operate as such if they had thought about it at all, or because the court
believes that by reason of the mores of the time justice requires that
it should so operate. It may then be described as a condition implied
by law, or better as a constructive condition.10
Promise and condition distinguished. Observe that an express or an
implied condition is not the same thing as an express or an implied
promise. Thus, in Constable v. Cloberie". there was a bilateral con-
tract in which the plaintiff expressly promised to sail with the next
favoring wind and the defendant promised to pay a certain sum if
the ship made the voyage to Cadiz and returned to the Downs. Sail-
ing with the next wind was a performance that was expressly promised,
but it was not a condition of the duty of the defendant to pay.1
Sailing with the next wind was an operative fact, for it would dis-
charge a duty of the plaintiff; but it had no operative effect upon the
defendant's duties or the plaintiff's rights. There was an express
condition attached to the defendant's duty to pay, but that was making
the voyage to Cadiz and return. The existence of this fact was not
promised at all.
tion, but in fact the parties did not intend the words to be thus interpreted, the
condition-is express even though it was unintended.
"Supposing a contract to have been duly formed, what is its result? An
obligation has been created between the contracting parties, by which rights are
conferred upon the one and duties are imposed upon the other, partly stipulated
for in the agreement, but partly also implied by law, which, as Bentham observes
(Works, III, I9o), 'has thus in every country supplied the shortsightedness of
individuals, by doing for them what they would have done for themselves, if
their imagination had anticipated the march of nature."' Holland, Jurisp. (Ioth
ed.) 278. In Leonard v. Dyer (1857) 26 Conn. 172, 178, the court said: "And
if we were to add stipulations to the contract which the parties themselves did
not make, it appears to us that such only should be inferred as the parties them-
selves would have made, had they foreseen the circumstances that rendered such
stipulations important." See also Bankes, L. J., in Groves v. Webb (1916, C. A.)
114 L. T. Rep. 1O82, O89.
"You can always imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it?
It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class,
or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude
of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement, and
therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions." Justice 0. W.
Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897) IO HAzv. L. REv. 466.
" (I626) Palmer, 397; s. c. Latch, 12, 49; s. c. Popham, 161.
'Of course substantial performance by the plaintiff would be a constructive
condition. See infra, p. 758. Sailing with the first wind might, conceivably, be
held to be of the essence, but it was not in fact so held. No doubt sailing within
a reasonable time would now be held to be a condition by construction of law.
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CONDITIONS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
A promise is always made by the act or acts of one of the parties,
such acts being words or other conduct expressing intention; a fact
can be made to operate as a condition only by the agreement of both
parties or by the construction of the law. The purpose of a promise is
the creation of a duty or a disability in the promisor;13 the purpose
of constituting some fact as a condition is always the postponement
of an instant duty (or other specified legal relation). The fulfilment
of a promise discharges a duty; the occurrence of a condition creates
a duty.14 The non-fulfilment of a promise is called a breach of con-
tract, and creates in the other party a secondary right to damages; it
is the failure to perform that which was required by a previous duty.
The non-occurrence of a condition will prevent the existence of a duty
in the other party; but it may not create any secondary duty at all,
and it will not unless someone has promised that it shall occur.
Of course a contract can be so constructed as to create a duty that
the fact operative as a condition shall come into existence. If in
Constable v. Cloberie the plaintiff had promised to make the voyage
and return, we should have a case where the future existence of the
fact (voyage and return) is expressly promised by the plaintiff and is
also a condition precedent to any instant duty of the defendant to pay.
The non-performance would then have double operation, on the one
hand preventing any instant duty in the defendant to pay freight and
on the other creating a secondary duty in the plaintiff to pay damages.
Such a condtion might be described as a promissory condition.15
' In some instances the purpose of a promise may be the creation of some
other legal relationship than duty between the promisor and the promisee. Thus,
A may make an offer to B and may promise for a consideration or under seal
not to withdraw the offer. This might be (and often has been) regarded as
creating a duty in A not to change his mind or not to notify B of such a change,
but it should far better be regarded as creating a power in B to be exercised
by acceptance and a disability in A to extinguish that power. Thus the purpose
of a promise may be the creation of a disability instead of a duty. See Offer,
Option, and Conditional Contract, infra, p. 763. For a more full discussion of
Irrevocable Offers see Offer and Acceptance (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, i69.
" The "duty" thus created may be either an instant, unconditional duty
requiring immediate performance, or a new conditional duty the condition of
which is not the same as that of its predecessor.
I See Home Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co. (i917, P- I.) OO At. 1OLO, holding
that a certain proviso created a condition but is not a promise and created no
duty. Also Coykendall v. Blackiner (1914, N. Y.) 161 App. Div. 11, 146 N. Y.
Supp. 631. For cases holding that the particular proviso was promissory and
created a duty and was not a mere condition of the other party's duty, see
St. Paul F. & 2. I. Co. v. Upton (189i) 2 N. D. 229, 5o N. W. 7o2; Boston S.
D. Co. v. Thomas (1898) 59 Kan. 47o, 53 Pac. 472. Some cases indicate a great
readiness to find a proynise by mere inference or implication. Dupont Powder
Co. v. Schlottman (1914, C. C. A. 2d) 218 Fed. 353; Patterson v. Meyerhofer
(1912) 204 N. Y. 96, 97 N. E. 472. Cf. Clark v'. Hovey (914) 217 Mass. 485,
1O5 N. E. 222.
HeinOnline -- 28 Yale L.J. 745 1918-1919
I 745
r i i l t t t t ti ,
such acts being ords r t er c ct e ressi i te ti ; f t
ca e a e t erate as iti l t r t f t
parties or by the construction of the la . he purpose of a pro ise is
t r ti f t i ilit i t isor ;13 t
f stit ti f t iti i l t t t
of a i sta t t ( r t er s ecifie le al r l ti ). f lfil t
f r is is r s t ; t rr f iti r t
a duty.14 he non-fulfil ent f a pro ise is called a reac f c -
tr t, r t s i t t r rt r ri t t ; it
is t f il r t rf r t t i s r ir r i t .
- rr ce f iti ill r t t i t t
i t e t er art ; t it t r t s r t t ll,
a it ill t riless s e e as r ise t t it s ll r.
r tr t t t t t t
t t ti
le . rie
r t r , s l r t f t r i t f t
fact ( a e r t r ) is r ssl r is t l i tiff i
also a condition rece e t t a i st t t f t f t t .
r ti i t t t i t t t i t
t t ti r
iti i t ri r i r iti .15
18 I i t t r i t ti
other legal relationship t a ty et een t e r is r a t e r is . s,
ff r t i i ti
t t it t . r ed
creati g a t i t t is i r t t tif f ,
t it l tt r ised
acceptance a a isa ilit i t ti is t t r. t r
f r is t r ti n f i ilit i t t . ff ,
Opti01~, ll itiollal tract, i fr , . . r r f ll i i f
le r ) U , 16
t l
iring i i t , ti al ti f
i i t t t t it .
18 . . . 1~ o m . 1917, R. 1.) 100 tl. 010, i
t t in i ted i
t . l ll . m 14, . ) . II
. . r l i t t t rti lar is i
r ted t s t r iti f t t rt ' t , '
. l . M. 1. ISg1) , 0 . 0 .
. o. v. s (18gB) a . 0, 53 ac. . e cases i i te r t
rea i ess t fi a r .mise ere i fere ce r i li ti . t
. . l tt , . . . . ; son
( 2) . . , . . . ct. l r . (1914) . ,
105 . . 222.
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It may be observed that both a promise and a condition are means
that are used to bring about certain desired action by another person.
For example, an insurance company desires the payment of premiums.
One means of securing this desired object would be to obtain a promise
by the insured to pay premiums; on failure to pay them an action
would lie. In fact, however, insurance policies seldom contain such a
promise; the payment of the premiums is secured in a more effective
way than that. The insurance company makes its own duty to pay
the amount of the policy expressly conditional upon the payment of
premiums. Here is no express promise of the insured creating a duty
to pay premiums, but there is an express condition precedent to his
right to recover on the policy. Payment by the insured is obtained
not by holding a lawsuit over him in terrorem but by hanging before
him a purse of money to be reached only by climbing the ladder of
premiums. Before bilateral contracts became enforceable this was the
only contractual way for a promisor to secure his desired object. He
might offer his promise and specify the desired performance as the one
mode of acceptance; or he might deliver his own sealed promise,
making it expressly conditional upon the desired performance. In
either case the promisee would have no legal right against the promisor,
and could not get the purse of money, unless he first performed as
desired. But as soon as bilateral contracts (mutual promises creating
mutual duties) became enforceable, the courts observed that a promisor
now had a new remedy and a new means of securing his desired object.
Previously, in getting a return promise he got nothing; now he got a
legally enforceable right. Hence, it did not appear unjust to declare
mutual promises to be independent, and to compel a defendant to per-
form as he had agreed even though the plaintiff had failed to perform
his part; the defendant had a like remedy in his turn against the
plaintiff.16 It gradually became evident, however, that the contract-
ing parties usually made no conscious choice of remedies, choosing
the remedy on a promise rather than the advantage given by a condi-
tion. Often the remedy on a promise is very inadequate, and it is
not surprising that the courts reverted to the earlier form. At first
they seized upon such words as "for" and "in consideration of,"
construing these to create express conditions.17 Later, by reading
wholly between the lines, they found a supposed intention of the
parties that the defendant's promise should be conditional, or in the
absence of any intention whatever they frankly constructed a condition
in order to do justice according to the mores of the time. Thus grew
up the rules of law concerning implied and constructive conditions.
' If there were no such return remedy the court would willingly imply a con-
dition. Pordage v. Cole (1669, K. B.) I Wins. Saund. 319 (semble).
'See Thorpe v. Thorpe (1701, K. B.) 12 Mod. 455; also Fineux, C. J., in
Y. B. 15 Hen. VII. f. io b, pl. 7.
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CONDITIONS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
Conditions precedent, concurrent, and subsequent. 'All conditions
are precedent to the legal relations that they operate to create, and
they are always subsequent to the legal relations and other facts that
preceded them. The terms precedent and subsequent express a rela-
tion in time between two facts, one of which is the legal relation itself;
and before using either one of them it is necessary to determine just
what two facts are being considered. In the case of Constable v.
Cloberie above stated, making the voyage to Cadiz and return was a
fact that was subsequent to the formation of the contract, subsequent
to acceptance of the offer; but it was precedent to the existence of
any instant duty in the defendant to pay, precedent also to any sec-
ondary right in the plaintiff to damages for non-payment.
A condition precedent is an operative fact that must exist prior to
the existence of some legal relation in which we are interested. The
particular relation most commonly in mind when this term is used is
either the instant and unconditional duty of performance by a promisor
or the secondary duty to pay damages for a breach of such duty of
performance.18
A condition subsequent is an operative fact that causes the termina-
tion of some previous legal relation in which we are interested. 0 The
term is used with reference to both primary contractual duties and
secondary duties.
2 0
"The following are illustrations. I promise to pay such an amount as X
may determine: Thurnell v. Balbirnle (1837, Ex.) 2 M. & W. 786; Old Colony
Ry. v. Brockton Ry. (1914) 218 Mass. 84, 105 N. E. 866; Scott v. Avery (1856)
5 H. L. Cas. 811. I promise to pay as soon as I am able: Work v. Beach (1891,
Sup. Ct) 13 N. Y. Supp. 678. See also Ulpian, Dig. 2, 14, 49. I promise to pay
after architect X has certified that the work is properly done: Clarke v. Watson
(1865) 18 C. B. N. S. 278; Granger Co. v. Brown-Ketchain Iron Works (1912)
204 N. Y. 218, 97 N. E. 523. Cf. Nolan v. Whitney (1882) 88 N. Y. 648
In these cases the determination by X, the financial ability, and the architect's
certificate are facts that operate as conditions precedent to the legal duty to pay.
" Examples of conditions subsequent to the secondary obligation and termi-
nating it are to be found in Seinmes v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1871, U. S.) 13 Wall.
i58; Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co. (1883) 51 Conn. 17; Read v. Insurance Co.
(1897) 1O3 Ia. 307, 72 N. W. 665; Ward v. Warren (19o3) z4' Or. lO2, 74 Pac.
482; Smart v. Hyde (1841, Ex.) 8 M. & W. 723. For instances of a condition
subsequent to the primary obligation, its non-occurrence being a condition pre-
cedent to the secondary obligation, see Gray v. Gardner (1821) 17 Mass. 188;
Moody v. Ins. Co. (1894) 52 Oh. St. 12, 38 N. E. Ioli.
" Conditions concurrent. There are many bilateral contracts creating mutual
duties requiring concurrent performances by the two parties. In such cases the
tendency has long been to hold that a tender of performance by one party is
a condition precedent to the instant duty of the other. Inasmuch as the per-
formances are to be simultaneous it. has led to their being called concurrent
conditions. It seems better, however, to say that there are concurrent condi-
tional duties, the instant duty of each party being subject to a condition pre-
cedent (tender by the other party). Illustrative cases are as follows:
Payment and conveyance in sales of land: Sherman v. Leveret (790, Conn.)
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The practice is almost universal of using these terms to describe
the legal operation of some fact without mentioning or even clearly
considering the particular legal relation to which the fact is being
related in time. The result is most distressing; it leaves the reader
confused and doubtful and it is a cause of conflict in decision, uncer-
tainty of law, and actual injustice. In one case a fact will be called
a condition precedent and in another case the same fact (or its non-
existence) will be called a condition subsequent, because in the first
case it is being subconsciously related to the legal relations that follow
it and in the other case to the legal relations that preceded it.
21
Burden of alleging and proving operative facts. It has been 'sup-
posed that by the use of these terms precedent and subsequent it can
be determined which party bears the burden of proof and the burden
of alleging the existence of the fact. This will now be considered.
The problem of pleading is not at all identical with the problem of
proof by means of evidence, but for our present purpose they may be
discussed together. The plaintiff must state in his declaration all
facts necessary to make out a "cause of action," and if his statements
are traversed he must later prove them by a preponderance of evidence.
What then is a "cause of action" in contract cases? In assumpsit
for damages it includes the formation of a valid contract and a breach
thereof by the defendant, a primary obligation and a secondary obliga-
tion. The primary obligation consists of those legal relations arising
at the time of acceptance; the secondary obligation consists of those
arising at the time of breach. There can be no breach until an active
primary duty exists. It would seem, therefore, that the plaintiff would
have to allege and prove every fact that is a condition precedent to
the existence of this primary duty and of the secondary duty arising
from its breach. Some of these facts are precedent to the primary
duty; others are subsequent thereto but are precedent to the secondary
duty.22
i Root, i69; Beecher v. Conradt (1855) 13 N. Y. io8; Goodisson v. Nunn (1792,
K. B.) 4 T. R. 761; Green v. Reynolds (1807, N. Y.) 2 Johns. 2o6.
Payment and delivery in sales of goods: Morton v. Lamb (1797, K. B.) 7
T. R. 125; Brown v. Rushton (1916) 223 Mass. 8o, iii N. E. 884; Diem v. Kob-
lit (I892) 49 Ohio St. 41, 29 N. E. if24.
2"That the confusion between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent
is both ancient and respectable, in property law as well as in contract law,
witness 2 Coke's Inst. ch. 27, 11: "Many are of opinion against Littleton in this
case . . . and that here Littleton of a condition precedent doth make it subse-
quent." Coke states the arguments pro and con. and then adds: "Benigne lector,
utere tuo judicio, nihil enim impedio."
"The burden of proving a fact is always thrown upon the plaintiff whenever
the court declares that fact to be a condition precedent. Also the complaint is
demurrable if the existence of the fact constituting such a condition is not
alleged. Worsley v. Wood (1796, K. B.) 6 T. R. 710; Newton Rubber Works
v. Graham (1898) 171 Mass. 352, 5o N. E. 547; Colt v. Miller (1852, Mass.) io
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CONDITIONS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
But a "cause of action" must exist at the time of bringing suit. It
is not enough that a breach occurred, giving rise to a secondary duty
to pay damages. That secondary duty must have continued existence.
After the birth of such a secondary duty many new facts may occur
prior to bringing suit that will destroy it. These operative facts are
subsequent to the birth of the secondary duty but their non-existence
is a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to a judgment, although
not precedent to his right to payment as promised. It might seem
therefore that the plaintiff must affirmatively allege every fact neces-
sary to the existence of the primary duty, to the birth of the sec-
ondary duty, and to the continued existence of fhe secondary duty
down to the time of suit,23 and bear the burden of proving his allega-
tions. Such, however, is not the case as to many of these operative
facts. No primary legal duty will exist if the parties made the con-
tract with an unlawful purpose, and yet the plaintiff is not required
either to allege or to prove the absence of such a purpose. The
defendant is no longer under his primary duty if he has repudiated
the contract for the fraud of the plaintiff, and yet the plaintiff need not
allege the absence of fraud and of disaffirmance. There are numerous
ways in which a primary duty can be discharged before breach and in
which a secondary duty can be discharged afterwards, but the burden
of allegation and proof is often thrown on the defendant. Such facts
are described as affirmative defenses.2 '
Cush. 49. See Ames, Cases on Pleadings, 307, citing many cases. Frequently the
ruling as to the burden of proof will be decisive of the whole case because of
the lack of evidence. Thus, where an insurance policy provided for payment
to the wife of the insured, if living, otherwise to the estate of the insured, and
both husband and wife went down with the Lusitania, the administrator of the
wife failed to recover because he could not prove that the husband died first.
McGowin v. Menken (1918, N. Y.) iig N. E. 877. It should be observed that
the husband's not dying first is equally a condition precedent to the right of his
administrator. This would become evident in an action by such administrator
against the insurance company.
' When a particular state of affairs is once shown to exist, the law will
assume its continued existence and throws upon the party alleging a new opera-
tive fact changing that state of affairs the burden of proving the new fact.
So the legal relations composing a primary obligation will be assumed to con-
tinue, as will also those composing a secondary obligation arising from breach
of contract. Since a "cause of action" consists of a secondary as well as a
primary obligation, one might suppose the plaintiff would have the burden of
proving all the facts necessary to both. It appears, however, that this is not the
case.
"Whenever a court describes a fact as a condition precedent it invariably
throws the burden of proof upon the plaintiff. When the court wishes to throw
the burden of proving the fact upon the defendant it will frequently bring this
about by describing the fact as a condition subsequent. Thus, it is often pro-
vided in insurance policies that the contract is to be "void" in a certain event
that may or may not happen; the burden of proving the occurrence of the event
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But a "cause of action" must exist at the time of bringing suit. It
is not enough that a breach occurred, giving rise to a secondary duty
to pay damages. That secondary duty must have continued existence.
After the birth of such a secondary duty many new facts may occur
prior to bringing suit that will destroy it. These operative facts are
subsequent to the birth of the secondary duty but their non-existence
is a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to a judgment, although
not precedent to his right to payment as promised. It ight see
therefore that the plaintiff must affirmatively allege every fact neces-
sary to the existence of the primary duty, to the birth of the sec-
ondary duty, and to the continued existence of the secondary duty
down to the time of suit,23 and bear the burden of proving his allega-
tions. Such, however, is not the case as to many of these operative
facts. No primary legal duty will exist if the parties ade the con-
tract with an unlawful purpose, and yet the plaintiff is not required
either to allege or to prove the absence of such a purpose. he
defendant is no longer under his primary duty if he has repudiated
the contract for the fraud of the plaintiff, and yet the plaintiff need not
allege the absence of fraud and of disaffirmance. There are nu erous
ways in which a primary duty can be discharged before breach and in
which a secondary duty can be discharged afterwards, but the burden
of allegation and proof is often thrown on the defendant. Such facts
are described as affirmative defenses.2 4.
Cush. 49. See Ames, Cases on Pleadil~gs, 307, citing many cases. Frequently the
ruling as to the burden of proof will be decisive of the whole case because of
the lack of evidence. Thus, where an insurance policy provided for payment
to the wife of the insured, if living, otherwise to the estate of the insured, and
both husband and wife went down with the Lusitania, the administrator of the
wife failed to recover because he could not prove that the husband died first.
McGowin v. Menken (1918, N. Y.) 119 N. E. 877. It should be observed that
the husband's not dying first is equally a condition precedent to the right of his
administrator. This would become evident in an action by such administrator
against the insurance company.
.. When a particular state of affairs is once shown to exist, the la ill
assume its continued existence and throws upon the party alleging a new opera-
tive fact changing that state of affairs the burden of proving the new fact.
So the legal relations composing a primary obligation will be assu ed to con-
tinue, as will also those composing a secondary obligation arising from breach
of contract. Since a "cause of action" consists of a secondary as ell as a
primary obligation, one might suppose the plaintiff would have the burden of
proving all the facts necessary to both. It appears, however, that this is not the
case.
.. Whenever a court describes a fact as a condition prece e t it invariably
throws the burden of proof upon the plaintiff. hen the court ishes to throw
the burden of proving the fact upon the defendant it ill frequently ring this
about by describing the fact as a condition subsequent. hus, it is often pro-
vided in insurance policies that the contract is to be "void" in a certain event
that mayor may not happen; the burden of proving the occurrence of the event
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Thus it is evident, in spite of very general assumptions to the con-
trary, that the burden of allegation and the burden of proof cannot
be determined by the test of such descriptive adjectives as precedent
and subsequent. It is no doubt true that the law on this subject needs
entire reconstruction and restatement, that there is no existing test
capable of logical definition, and that the rules are largely arbitrary
as well as conflicting. Such rules as now exist will frequently be
found to be based on false logic or on some ill-defined notion of public
policy.
25
Conditions in unilateral contracts. A unilateral contract is one
where only one of the parties assumes a contractual duty and only the
other acquires any contractual right; as, for example, where A sells
and delivers a chattel to B on credit. In such a case full performance
by A is a condition precedent to the existence of any primary duty in
B .26 There may, however, be further conditions, both intentional
(i. e., express and implied in fact) and constructive, precedent to B's
instant and unconditional duty to pay the price or to his secondary
duty to pay damages for breach. B's promise might be expressly
conditional, e. g., B is to pay "if his ship comes in."27 If B promised
to pay in his own personal labor, his duty would be constructively
conditional on his continued life and health.
Conditions in bilateral contracts. A bilateral contract is made by
mutual promises and is one in which each party assumes a duty of
performance. Each duty may require either instant performance or
future performance, and each may be either conditional or uncondi-
tional. The condition of either party's duty may be performance by
the other party or an act of a third party or some future event or
information as to a past event. If the duty of A is conditional upon
the prior performance of B in accordance with his promise, or upon
the tender of such performance by B, A's promise is said to be depen-
dent.. If it is not so conditional, his promise is said to be independent.2 8
is nearly always put upon the defendant company. The occurrence of the event
is indeed subsequent to the primary obligation, but its non-occurrence is a condi-
tion precedent to any active duty of the defendant to pay, either primary or
secondary. See Benanti v. Delaware Ins. Co. (1912) 86 Conn. 15, 84 Atl. iO9;
Marcovitch v. Liverpool V. F. Soc. (1912, C. A.) 28 Times L. R. I88; Moody
v. Ins. Co. (2894) 52 Oh. St. 12, 38 N. E. ioII; Murray v. New York Life Ins.
Co. (1881) 85 N. Y. 236; Bowers v. Great Eastern Cas. Co. (i928, Pa.) io3
Atl. 536. See further Ames, Cases on Pleading, 302-306, citing more than IOO
cases.
'For a very excellent discussion of principles involved, see the dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Doe in Kendall v. Brownson (1866) 47 N. H. 186, 196.
"Not necessarily precedent, however, to an irrevocable power of acceptance.
See (97) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 16g, Offer and Acceptance and Some of the
Resulting Legal Relations.
'Martindale v. Fisher (1745, K. B.) i Wilson, 88.
" Where B sells goods to A, delivery to be made May i, payment promised
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CONDITIONS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
If the performances of the two parties are required to be concurrent
in time and neither party can be charged with a breach until after a
tender of performance by the other, both promises are dependent and
the conditions are said to be concurrent.9 That a promise is depen-
dent is merely one way of saying that the duty it creates is a conditional
duty. The term has been used chiefly with respect to mutual promises
not made conditional in express terms, the condition being implied or
constructive.
Effect of non-oecurrence of a condition. The non-occurrence of the
operative fact described as a condition must be sharply distinguished
from the non-performance of a promise, although the jerformance that
is promised may also be operative as a condition. So long as the
operative fact remains non-existent, the expected legal relation (e. g.,
the primary duty of instant performance or the secondary duty to pay
damages) does not exist. If, however, the time for the occurrence
of the condition has not yet expired, the previous legal relations remain
unaffected. Suppose that A has made a conditional promise to convey
Blackacre to B, the condition being that B shall tender $iooo to A
within one year. A tender of the money at any time during the year
will turn A's conditional duty into an instant duty; during the entire
year there remains the possibility that the operative fact will come
into existence. At the expiration of the year, however, no such possi-
bility remains, and A's previous conditional duty (or liability) 30 is now
terminated. Suppose further that the consideration for A's condi-
tional promise to convey was a return promise of B to pay $Iooo within
one year independently of conveyance by A. Now the tender of pay-
ment is an act that B's duty requires, as well as a condition precedent
to A's instant duty to convey. Failure to tender within the year is
now a breach of duty as well as the non-occurrence of a condition;
it creates in B a secondary duty to pay damages in addition to termi-
nating A's conditional duty to convey.31
by A on June i, the promise of B to deliver the goods is independent and the
promise of A is dependent. In the absence of delivery by B, A is under no
duty to pay. Norrington v. Wright (1885) 115 U. S. 118, 6 Sup. Ct 12. So if
B agrees to work for one month for A for $1oo, B's promise to work is inde-
pendent and A's promise to pay is dependent It does not follow from this
that B's duty is entirely unconditional in either case; for in the first he is
privileged not to deliver on May i in case A is insolvent, and in the second he
is privileged not to work in case of illness. Ex parte Chalmers (1873) L. R. 8
Ch. App. 289; Spalding v. Rosa (1877) 71 N. Y. 40.
' Morton v. Lamb (1797, K. B.) 7 T. R. 125; Beecher v. Conradt (1855) 13
N. Y. io8. See note 20, supra.
:o See note 5, . upra.
'In this case, however, the contract should not be said to be discharged as a
whole, because A still has his right to full payment-a right specifically enforce-
able in equity.
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If the performances of the two parties are required to be concurre t
in time and neither party can be charged with a breach until after a
tender of performance by the other, both promises are dependent and
the conditions are said to be concurrent.29 That a promise is depen-
dent is merely one way of saying that the duty it creates is a conditional
duty. The term has been used chiefly with respect to utual pro ises
not made conditional in express terms, the condition being implied or
constructive.
Effect of non-occurrence of a condition. The non-occurrence of the
operative fact described as a condition must be sharply distinguished
from the non-performance of a promise, although the perfor ance that
is promised may also be operative as a condition. So long as the
operative fact remains non-existent, the expected legal relation (e. g.,
the primary duty of instant performance or the secondary duty to pay
damages) does not exist. If, however, the ti e for the occurrence
of the condition has not yet expired, the previous legal relations remain
unaffected. Suppose that A has made a conditional promise to convey
Blackacre to B, the condition being that B shall tender $rooo to A
within one year. A tender of the money at any time during the year
will turn A's conditional duty into an instant duty; during the entire
year there remains the possibility that the operative fact will co e
into existence. At the expiration of the year, however, no such possi-
bility remains, and A's previous conditional duty (or liability) 30 is
terminated. Suppose further that the consideration for 's condi-
tional promise to convey was a return promise of B to pay $rooo within
one year independently of conveyance by A. Now the tender of pay-
ment is an act that B's duty requires, as well as a condition precedent
to A's instant duty to convey. Failure to tender within the year is
now a breach of duty as well as the non-occurrence of a condition;
it creates in B a secondary duty to pay damages in addition to ter i-
nating A's conditiona~ duty to convey.31
by A on June I, the promise of B to deliver the goods is independent and the
promise of A is dependent. In the absence of delivery by B, A is under no
duty to pay. Norringto1~ 'll. Wright (1885) uS U. S. u8, 6 Sup. Ct. 12. So if
B agrees to work for one month for A for $100, B's promise to work is inde-
pendent and A's promise to pay is dependent. It does not follow fro this
that B's duty is entirely unconditional in either case; for in the first he is
privileged not to deliver on May I in case A is insolvent, and in the second he
is privileged not to work in case of illness. Ex parte Chalmers (1873) L. 8
Ch. App. 28g; Spalding'll. Rosa (1877) 71 . . 40.
:0 Morto1~ 'll. Lamb (1797, K. B.) 7 T. R 125; Beecher'll. onradt (1855)
N. Y. loS. ~ee note 20, supra.
"" See note 5, supra.
31 In this case, however, the contract should not be said to be discharged as
whole, because A still has his right to full payment-a right specifically enforce-
able in equity.
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Where the fact that operates as a condition was not agreed upon as
such by the parties, either expressly or impliedly, but is a condition
by construction of law, the non-existence of the operative, fact called
a c6ndition has sometimes been described as an "equitable defense."
At the very best, this term "defense" is analytically misleading. In
the absence of the operative fact there never was a cause of action.
The question here is not as to which party shall prove the facts, but
as to the operative effect of the facts after being proved. The word
"equitable" is equally undesirable. It renders accurate historical (not
analytical) service in one instance only, and that is in a case where
the fact in question was held to operate as a condition in the court of
chancery only, and not in the courts of common law, of admiralty, of
the merchants, of the manors, of the cities, and of the church. In
cases of this sort the will of the chancellor eventually became para-
mount and his procedure became effective so as practically to nullify
the. rules of the other courts. Thereafter the non-existence of the
fact that may be described as an "equitable" condition meant that
the contemplated legal relation did not exist, that the plaintiff had
no right and that the defendant was under no duty. In the present
state of our legal system it is seldom necessary or desirable to make
use of the word "equitable" to describe the jural effect of a fact that
operates as a constructive condition. Such a fact is nearly always a
constructive condition in all courts alike, and its existence or non-
existence has the same operative jural effect in all courts alike. There
is conflict, indeed, in determining whether or not a certain fact should
operate as a condition; but, generally speaking, this is no longer a
conflict between the King's Bench and the Chancery, it is a conflict
between Judge A and Judge B.
Rules for determining what facts operate as conditions. Everyone
knows that the "construction" of a contract is one of the most difficult
problems known to the law. What is.the operative legal effect of facts
occurring subsequently to acceptance of an offer? In answering this
question in individual cases jurists have constructed various rules,
some of which are of service but none of which can safely be followed
in all cases. Too often they are expressed in terms of mere verbal
interpretation, the general dogma being avowed that "the law cannot
make contracts for the parties." They are nearly always expressed
in terms of logical exactitude, nursing that "illusion of certainty" to
which Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has frequently referred.
Candor compels the admission that logic is not the decisive factor and
that certainty and uniformity do not exist even within the limits of a
single jurisdiction. 2
The reply of the defendant in Norrington v. Wright (8885) 115 U. S. 118,
6 Sup. Ct. 12, was justified by the state of the law. "You ask us to determine
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CONDITIONS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
Whether or not some fact is expressly required as a condition is,
indeed, to be determined in accordance with rules of verbal interpreta-
tion; but how easily and effectively can we read between the lines
when the express requirement seems to operate harshly and unfairly!
We may calmly disregard it or we may openly nullify its operation on
the ground that new facts, unforeseen by the parties, have occurred.
No doubt, too, this is in accordance with our long established mores.
The approval of the community is not obtained by insisting on the letter
of the bond. Thus, where the promise was to pay a price after a
named architect had given his certificate and not otherwise, the
promisor has not infrequently been held in duty bound to pay even
though no certificate has been given.33 Likewise a contract expressly
describing some fact as a condition subsequent, providing that an
existing right of action shall cease if the claimant fails to bring suit
within a twelvemonth, has been openly set aside because the bringing
of the suit was made very difficult by the breaking- out of war.3 4
There are, to be sure, variations in the readiness with which courts set
aside express terms of this sort and we are sometimes reminded that
the paramount public policy is that we must not lightly interfere with
freedom of contract.3"
If, as appears, courts very often feel free to nullify express condi-
tions and to deprive facts of the legal effect that the parties expressly
stated they should have, we need not be at all surprised to find that
they act much more freely in giving a legal effect to facts that the
parties said nothing about, that is, in creating constructive conditions.
Here, as elsewhere, judicial precedent plays an important part; but
circumstances alter cases, and the circumstances vary so widely and
so frequently that general rules become pitfalls. It is no doubt going
too far, however, to suggest that the only unvarying rule is that we
whether we will or will not object to receive further shipments because of past
defaults. We tell you we will if we are entitled to do so, and will not if we are
not entitled to do so. We do not think you have the right to compel us to
decide a disputed question of law to relieve you from the risk of deciding it
yourself. You know quite as well as we do what is the rule, and its uncertainty
of application."
'Nolan v. Whitney (1882) 88 N. Y. 648. This case has been disapproved in
Massachusetts. Audette v. L'Union St. Joseph (igoi) 178 Mass. 113, 59 N. E.
668. In England it would not be followed, but the condition is nullified if the
certificate is withheld by collusion. Batterbury v. Vyse (1863, Ex.) 2 H. & C. 42.
" Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co. (871, U. S.) 13 Wall. 15& See also Read v.
Insurance Co. (1897) 103 Ia. 307, 72 N. W. 665.
See Tullis v. Jacson [18921 3 Ch. 441, quoting Sir George Jessel. For a case
giving full effect to an express condition even though it caused an extraordinary
forfeiture and in spite of the fact that the plaintiff's non-performance was due
in part to erroneous action of the Court of Appeals itself, see Evans v. Supreme
Council (1978) 223 N. Y. 497, 12c N. E. 93.
5,
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YALE LAW JOURNAL
must act as our neighbors believe that a just and reasonable man would
act under the circumstances.3 6
Waiver of conditions. It is well established that a condition pre-
cedent to a contract duty of immediate performance may be waived
by a voluntary act of the party who is undertaking the duty. The
same cannot be said with assurance of other burdensome legal relations.
Such a condition certainly cannot be waived or dispensed with by the
opposite party to the legal relation, who will benefit by the waiver-
the expectant holder of the right, power, privilege, or immunity.
The term waiver is one of those words of indefinite connotation in
which our legal literature abounds; like a cloak, it covers a multitude
of sins.3 7  In the present instance the word is used to describe almost
any voluntary act of a contracting party which operates to bring his
contractual duty into existence even in the absence of some fact that
previously was a condition precedent. It may consist of a mere act
of assent to the new legal relation; and although its legal operation
is rendered more certain in case the other party gives a new considera-
tion or acts in reliance upon the waiver, neither consideration nor
change of position seems to be necessary. The new act of assent
operates as a substitute for that which previously was a condition, and
it so operates in the case of both express and constructive conditions.3
8
The term waiver is also used to refer to conduct that now makes it
inequitable to insist upon the previous condition, even though the party
acting did not in fact assent to a waiver.8  In these cases, however,
Since the present article is intended to deal with conditions chiefly from the
standpoint of legal analysis, no attempt is made to state the numerous rules for
determining the existence of implied or constructive conditions. There are many
such rules, doubtful in form of statement and more doubtful in application, with
reference to conditions in instalment contracts, employment contracts, aleatory
contracts, and the like.
I See Ewart (1917) Waiver Distributed.
"8Where time is of the essence, the condition can be waived by granting an
extension, and the one so waiving cannot thereafter enforce a provision for
liquidated damages for delay. Maryland Steel Co. v. United States (I915) 235
U. S. 451, 35 Sup. Ct. 19o.
"He may waive the condition, and accept the title though defective. If he
does, the seller may not refuse to convey because the buyer could not have
been compelled to waive.... We think the waiver to be effective did not call
for the seller's approval .... From the moment that the waiver was announced,
the remedy was mutual." Catholic F. M. Society v. Ousanni (1915) 215 N.- Y.
i, iog N. E. 8o.
See further Komnan v. Trainer (1917) 258 Pa. 362, IOI Atl. 105o; Cape May
R. E. Co. v. Henderson (1911) 231 Pa. 82, 79 Atl. 982.
Where the plaintiff sues on an express contract and avers full performance,
it is a variance to prove substantial performance and a waiver. Allen v. Burns
(1909) 201 Mass. 74, 87 N.- E. 194.
The approval of an architect as a condition may be waived by accepting and
using the building. Pennsylvania Rubber Co. v. Detroit Shipbuilding Co. (,9,5)
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CONDITIONS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
there must be some change of position by the other party in reliance
upon the supposed 'waiver. The conduct and its results operate much
after the manner of an estoppel.
It will be observed that the doctrine of waiver is practically a nullifi-
cation of the doctrine of consideration in certain cases. Where there
is action in reliance upon the waiver the case falls easily within the
group of cases holding that certain kinds of subsequent reliance upon
a promise are a sufficient consideration ;40 but where the waiver consists
of a mere voluntary assent there is no consideration of any sort, and yet
a new duty is thereby created where no such duty previously existed.41
This doctrine applies, however, only to conditions in the sense hereto-
fore explained, as including operative facts subsequent to acceptance.
One cannot create a primary obligation by "waiver"; for that, there
must be a specialty or a consideration. No doubt in most cases of
waiver, it will be found that there has been a change of position by the
other party in reliance upon the act of waiver.
Impossible conditions. We must first distinguish the question of
possibility of performance of a thing promised, as a condition precedent
to the duty of the promisor. Where such performance is legally or
physically impossible at the time the promise is made, no duty arises,
not even a liability to a duty. In such case the acceptance is an
inoperative fact and we should say that no contract is formed. Where
the impossibility arises subsequently to acceptance, the existing condi-
tional duty is terminated. The absence of such impossibility is a
condition precedent to the duty of the promisor' to perform as promised
and to his secondary duty to pay damages for breach.4 2
In the present paragraph we are dealing with cases where perform-
ance of the acts promised by the defendant is entirely possible, but
x86 Mich. 305, 152 N. W. 1O71. Also by making a number of payments without
insisting on the certificate. McKenna v. Vernon (1917) 258 Pa. 18, iox At. gi9;
Mayer Const. Co. v. Amer. Sterilizer Co. (1917) 258 Pa. 217, 1Ol Atl. 1002. Also
by accepting a short delivery of goods. Craig v. Lane (i912) 212 Mass. 195, 98
N. E. 685.
" See Anson on Contracts (Corbin's ed. 1919) sec. 127 note.
'Where proof of loss within a fixed time is made a condition by an insurance
policy, the condition may be waived even after the expiration of the period fixed.
Johnson v. Bankers, etc. Co. (1915) 129 Minn. 18, 151 N. W. 413; Dezell v.
Fidelity, etc. Co. (19o3) 176 Mo. 253, 75 S. W. iO2; Kiernan v. Dutchess, etc.
Co. (1896) i5o N. Y. i9o, 44 N. E. 698; Lebanon etc. Co. v. Erb (1886) 112 Pa.
149, 4 AtI. 8; Owen v. Farmers, etc. Co. (1869, N. Y.) 57 Barb. 518.
The duty of an indorser on a negotiable instrument is conditional upon demand
and notice; but even after failure of this condition, a voluntary waiver will
bind the indorser to pay. Rindge v. Kimball (1878) 124 Mass. 209.
'No further discussion of the effect of this sort of impossibility will be
attempted in the present article. See (1913) 22 YALE LAw JoUR NAL, 519 ff.
Discharge of Contracts, and Anson on Contracts (Corbin's ed. igig) sees.
373-380.
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where there is a condition precedent to his duty of performance the
occurrence of which is legally or physically impossible. In this case,
also, the impossibility may exist at the time of acceptance or may arise
subsequently. Suppose the defendant has promised to pay $ioo, but
only on condition that X shall reach the moon. Here the act to be
performed by the defendant is quite possible but the act to be per-
formed by X is not. Here no duty or liability is .created, and the
defendant's promise would no doubt be held to be inoperative as a
consideration for a return promise.43 Suppose the defendant has
promised to pay $ioo, but the promise is to be void if X shall reach
the moon. Here the reaching of the moon is a condition subsequent,
and since it cannot be fulfilled the promise creates an unconditional
duty to pay." In this case the not-reaching of the moon is in fact a
condition precedent to the active duty of payment, but since the exist-
ence of this fact is certain it may be disregarded.
A like result is obtained where the existence of the fact that operates
as a condition becomes impossible after acceptance of the offer but
before the time for performance, except that in this case the defen-
dant's promise is a sufficient consideration for the return promise and
there was a valid contract. If B promises to paint a house and A
promises to pay $IOO after the house is painted, there is a valid con-
tract; but if the house is totally destroyed before painting, A is under
no contract duty to pay $ioo. In such a case it is possible for the
court to create a non-contract debt to pay for value received, but this
is quite a different matter.45 Suppose B has built a house in return
for A's promise to pay after architect X shall certify his approval,
and X dies or becomes insane before he can inspect the house. It is
altogether probable that a court would here disregard the express term
creating a condition and compel A to pay the agreed sum on a reason-
able showing that the house is properly built.'6 In so holding, the
'Yet the court said in Worsley v. Wood (1796, K. B.) 6 T. R. 7,o, "If there
be a condition precedent to do an impossible thing, the obligation becomes
single." By this no doubt the court meant that the obligation becomes uncondi-
tional. Such appears to be the continental rule in cases of conditional donations
by will. French Civil Code, sec. goo; II Inst. Justinian, i4. But in the case
of contracts with impossible conditions precedent, the rule is generally stated as
in the text above. French Civ. Code, sec. 1172; Ulpian, Dig. 45, 1, 7; Gaius,
III Inst 98; 3 Savigny, System, sec. 124.
"See Rolle Abr. 42o (E) ; Co. Litt. 2o6. The same result obtains where the
occurrence of a condition subsequent becomes impossible after the formation
of the contract. Such a condition subsequent has been flatly disregarded in a
case where its occurrence was made inevitable (not impossible) by act of the
law. Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1871, U. S.) 13 Wall. i58. (The condition
subsequent to the duty of instant payment was forbearance to sue for twelve
months.)
See Butterfield v. Byron (i8gi) 153 Mass. 517, 27 N. E. 667.
See Reed v. Loyal Protective Association (igo8) 154 Mich. i6i, 117 N. W.
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CONDITIONS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
court is either determining that the certificate was not in fact a condi-
tion or else it is creating a duty to which the parties did not in fact
assent.
Prevention by the defendant of the existence of the fact that is a
condition. Where the non-occurrence of a condition precedent to the
defendant's duty has been caused by the act of the defendant himself,
that act will gravely affect the existing legal relations.
In many cases it will be held to be a "waiver" of the condition.T
Thus in contracts of employment the doing of the work is usually a
condition precedent to the duty of the employer to pay, but if the
workman is wrongfully discharged he can maintain an action for
damages without showing that the work was done.48 In such a case,
however, the workman is not now generally held to be entitled to main-
tain an action of debt for the full contract price. The actual rendition
of the service is still a condition precedent to such a right, because it
is not regarded as just for the plaintiff to have both his time and his
money, even though the defendant is in the wrong.49
In other cases the act of the defendant has been held to be a breach
of contract on the theory that he has promised, expressly or impliedly,
not to prevent the occurrence of the condition.50 In some of these
cases the inference of a promise seems far-fetched.
A suggestion has been thrown out that the act of the defendant is
6oo; London and N. E. Co. v. Schlesinger [ig6] i K. B. 2o; Mayer Const. Co.
v. Amer. Sterilizer Co. (917) 258 Pa. 217, 1o Ati. xoo2; Deyo v. Hammond
(1894) IO2 Mich. 122, 6o N. W. 455; Trippe v. Provident Fund Society (1893)
14o N. Y. 23, 35 N. E. 316; Comstock v. Fraternal Accident Ass'n. (19o3), 16
Wis. 382, 93 N. W. 22; Leiston Gas Co. v. Leiston, etc. Council [igi6] 2 K. B.
428. Cf. Whiteside v. North American Acc. Ins. Co. (IgII) 200 N. Y. 320, 93
N. E. 948.
" Young v. Hunter (1852) 6 N. Y. 203; Ripley v. McClure (1849) 4 Exch.
345; Mansfield v. Hodgdon (1888) 147 Mass. 304, 17 N. E. 544; Louisville &
N. R. v. Goodnight (1874, Ky.) io Bush, 552; United States v. United Eng. &
Con. Co. (94) 234 U. S. 236, 34 Sup. Ct 843; Pneumatic Signal Co. v. Texas
& P. R. R. (igio) 200 N. Y. 125, 93 N. E. 471; Batterbury v. Vyse (1863, Ex.)
2 H. & C. 42; French Civil Code, sec. 1178; Ulpian, Dig. 50, 17, i6i.
"Barton v. Gray (i885) 57 Mich. 622, 24 N. W. 638; McCargo v. ergens
(I9m) 2*6 N. Y. 363, 372, 99 N. E. 838; Tucker v. Boston (1916) 223 Mass.
478, X12 N. E. go.
"Clark v. Marsiglia (1845, N. Y. Sup. Ct) x Denio, 317.
'Where the plaintiff had agreed to buy certain land and then to convey it to
the defendant who promised to pay a price, and later the defendant bought the
land himself, the plaintiff was held entitled to damages. Patterson v. Meyer-
hofer (1912) 204 N. Y. 96, 97 N. E. 472. To similar effect are Dupont Powder
Co. v. Schlottman (1914, C. C. A. 2d) 218 Fed. 353; Simon v. Etgen (1915) 213
N. Y. 589, io7 N. E. io66; Brucker v. Manistee R. R. (191i) 166 Mich. 330, 130
N. W. 822; Gay v. Blanchard (188o) 32 La. Ann. 497, 504; U. S. v. Behan (1884)
Xo U. S. 338, 4 Sup. Ct. 81. But see contra Clark v. Hovey (914) 217 Mass.
485, xo5 N. E. 222.
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a tort.51 This could be justified on the theory that the plaintiff had
a valuable power to create rights by performing the act that operates
as a condition and that the act of the defendant is a wrongful destruc-
tion of this power. The defendant's act will of course be tortious if
it amounts to the conversion or destruction of some physical property
of the plaintiff.
If the defendant has already received benefits from a part-perform-
ance by the plaintiff, he should certainly be bound to pay the reason-
able value thereof, as a quasi-contract or non-contract debt.52 This is
correct beyond question if the prevention by the defendant was not a
privileged act, and it seems probably correct even if the defendant's
act was privileged.
In some cases the prevention by the defendant has been held to be
privileged. 3 In such case the defendant is liable neither for breach
of contract nor in tort, and probably the condition precedent to his
own contractual duty should not be regarded as waived.
The problem discussed above is to be distinguished from prevention
by the plaintiff of the performance promised by the defendant. In
case of such prevention the defendant is not guilty of a breach.54
The doctrine of substantial performance. There has arisen in the
United States an indefinite doctrine sometimes referred to as that of
substantial performance. It is a doctrine that deals not with perform-
ance of a duty as a discharge thereof but with performance by the
plaintiff as a condition precedent to the active duty of performance
by the defendant. Where a contractor is sued for non-performance
he cannot wholly avoid paying damages by showing that he sub-
stantially performed or came near performing or gave something
equally as good; but when he brings suit as a plaintiff he can fre-
quently win even though he has not performed his own part in every
minute detail.
Suppose that the plaintiff has substantially performed as required by
his own promise but not completely in every respect ;--the court must
5 MacPherson v. Mackay (igi8, N. J. Sup. Ct') 1o3 Atl. 36. The case might
perhaps be brought within the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye (1853, Q. B.) 2 El. &
BI. 216.
"Hoyt v. Pomeroy (I933) 87 Conn. 41, 86 At. 755.
"Clark v. Hovey, supra. A case may be supposed where the plaintiff agreed
to furnish certain goods, delivery being a condition precedent to his right to pay-
ment, and where he has been prevented from fulfilling this condition by the
lawful act of the defendant in buying up the entire market supply (for actual
use and with no intent to corner the market). The defendant's act might be held
to discharge the plaintiff's duty to deliver, but it would not be the breach of any
duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.
" See United States v. Peck (i88o) lO2 U. S. 64; Porto Rico v. Title Guar.
& Surety Co. (1913) 227 U. S. 382, 389, 33 Sup. Ct. 362; 2 Coke, Inst. ch. 27,
ig; Rolle Abr. 453 (N) 3, 4. Cf. Blandford v. Andreus (1599) Cro. Eliz. 694.
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now determine whether or not some act unperformed was a condition
precedent to the defendant's duty. It is never correct to say that
substantial performance of a condition is sufficient; but it is frequently
correct to say that absolutely exact and complete performance by the
plaintiff as promised is not a condition precedent to the duty of the
defendant. If substantial performance by the plaintiff was sufficient
to charge the defendant, then such substantial performance was the
only condition and the requirement has been exactly fulfilled. The
question of the plaintiff's duty to pay damages for his own partial non-
performance is a different question altogether. Substantial perform-
ance of A's promise may be sufficient to enable him to maintain action
against B, and yet at the same time be insufficient to prevent B from
having an action against A.
Where the defendant has clearly stipulated that a certain perform-
ance by the plaintiff must precede his own duty to pay, the specified
performance is a condition precedent. The court can, it is true,
accept- "something equally as good," making it operate as the only
condition, and then compel the defendant to pay.55 This is what the
irreverent might describe as making a contract for the parties.56 If
the defendant has not stipulated that the performance by the plaintiff
shall be a condition precedent to his own active duty, but has merely
caused the plaintiff to make a promise and thus undertake a duty on
his own part, then the court need not require any performance at all
by the plaintiff as a condition precedent-to the defendant's duty, and
if it requires any performance at all as a condition it is fair and just
to require only substantial performance as such condition.
Our conclusions may be stated as follows:
(i) Every performance that constitutes a condition must be ful-
filled exactly.
(2) What is a condition is a question of interpretation and con-
struction (in the broadest sense).
(3) Substantial performance of the acts promised by the plaintiff
may be made the only condition of the defendant's duty, either by
reasonable inference of fact or by pure construction of law. If this
much performance has taken place, the plaintiff can maintain debt (or
its equivalent) for the agreed price. In such case it is proper for
him to allege full performance, for this means performance of all
things necessary to create the defendant's duty to pay, not performance
of a sort that fully discharges his own duty. Non-substantial varia-
tions from the exact terms of the contract, even though they are con-
See Nolan v. Whitney (1882) 88 N. Y. 648.
The rule in Nolan. v. Whitney, supra, is expressly disapproved in Audette
v. L'Union St. Joseph (igoi) 178 Mass. 113, 59 N. E. 668. In Crouch v. Gut-
miann (1892) 134 N. Y. 45, 3 N. E. 268, it is said in the dissenting opinion that
the court has gone too far in making new contracts for the parties.
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scious on the part of the plaintiff, will not prevent his recovery on the
express contract; and no waiver on the part of the defendant is
required.57 For such non-substantial breaches the defendant has a
counterclaim for damages and may thus reduce the amount to be
recovered by the plaintiff; but the defendant is not privileged not to
perform as he promised.58 In like manner equity frequently decrees
specific performance by the defendant, allowing him compensation
for slight deficiencies.59
(4) Where substantial performance by the plaintiff is a condition
precedent to the duty of immediate performance by the defendant, and
this condition has not occurred, the plaintiff can maintain no suit for
the agreed price unless there is a waiver of the condition by the defen-
dant.60 If there has been a true waiver by the defendant, his duty of
immediate performance exists and the plaintiff can maintain an action
on the express contract for the agreed price or its equivalent. In such
case, however, the plaintiff should not allege full performance of
conditions; if he does his proof will show a variance. The operative
facts are the agreement, jthe incomplete performance, and the waiver,
and these should be alleged. 61 The facts that operate as a waiver may
be either an expression of consent by the defendant or such conduct
as gives rise to an estoppel.62 There is a clear distinction between facts
that operate to create a duty on the defendant to pay the contract
price, and those that create merely a duty to pay for value received.
The first raises a contract debt (or a duty to perform as promised) ;
the second raises a quasi-contract or non-contract debt, the sum due
being measured by the value received. The second is not a case of
waiver at all.6 3  Both the first and the second must likewise be dis-
: Smzith v. Mathews Const. Co. (1919, Cal.) 179 Pac. 205.
' 3Nolan v. Whitney (1882) 88 N. Y. 648; Pitcairn v. Philip Hiss Co. (1902,
C. C. A. 3d) 113 Fed. 492; Jones & H. Co. v. Davenport (igoi) 74 Conn. 418,
5o At. lO28; Hayward v. Leonard (1828, Mass.) 7 Pick. 181; Palmer v. Britan-
nia Co. (9O) 188 Ill. 5o8, 59 N. E. 247; Ashley v. Henahan (1897) 56 Oh. St.
559, 47 N. E. 573.
'Where the vendor has promised to convey a farm containing a certain
number of acres and it turns out that there is a small deficiency, specific per-
formance with compensation will be decreed. King v. Bardeau (1822, N. Y.)
6 Johns. Ch. 38; Foley v. Crow (1872) 37 Md. 51; Dyer v. Hargrave (18o5,
Eng. Ch.) io Vesey, 5o5; Creigh v. Boggs (1882) I9 W. Va. 240.
Such a decree is refused where the deficiency is too great. Wetmore v. Bruce
(i8go) 118 N. Y. 319, 23 N. E. 303; Lombard v. Chicago Congregation (1872)
64 Il1. 477.
' See note 64, infra.
"t Allen v. Burns (19o9) 201 Mass. 74, 87 N. E. I94; Herdal v. Sheehy (1916)
173 Cal. 163, 159 Pac. 422; Daley v. Russ (i89o) 86 Cal 114, 24 Pac. 867.
' See above, Waiver of Conditions, 754.
' The mere user of a building that is not substantially in accord with the
contract is not usually a waiver at all. Yet it does show that the defendant has
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CONDITIONS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
tinguished from facts that operate as a discharge of the defendant's
counterclaim against the plaintiff. The first two determine the defen-
dant's duty to the plaintiff; the third affects the plaintiff's duty to the
defendant. A condition precedent to the defendant's duty can be
waived by him without consideration; it is generally held impossible
for him thus to discharge the other party's duty to him.
(5) What constitutes substantial performance must be determined
with reference to the particular facts in each case. The question is
always one of degree and its solution must be doubtful in many cases.
If the defendant has himself regarded the deviation as not going to
the essence, this will generally be decisive for the court. The ratio
of damage done to benefits received will be considered. The degree
of moral delinquency on the plaintiff's part will go far to resolve
doubts: Has the plaintiff wilfully regarded his contract as a "scrap
of paper"? Was his non-performance intentional but caused by diffi-
culties and hardships? Was his breach an unconscious one? Was he
grossly negligent or reasonably prudent? It is frequently said any
wilful breach on the plaintiff's part will prevent any recovery by him
against the defendant."4 This is altogether too strong a statement.
Even while laying down such a principle, the court is nevertheless con-
sidering the degree of non-performance and the degree of moral delin-
quency.
'Personal satisfaction as a condition. One party to a contract may
expressly promise that he will do his work to the personal satisfaction
of the promisee. There is nothing improper about such a promise, and
for failure to perform as agreed and to satisfy the promisee the latter
should certainly be entitled to damages. It does not follow, however,
that the defendant's duty to pay the contract price is conditional upon
such personal satisfaction. It may be made so in express terms, as
where the defendant promises to pay "on condition" that he is satisfied
or "after" he is satisfied.65 A doubt has sometimes been expressed
received value, for which he ought to pay if such value is greater than the
damage caused by the plaintiff's faulty performance. The cases very generally
fail to make the distinction pointed out above, even though the measure of
recovery depends upon it See the cases in note 58, supra.
" Gillespie Tool Co. v. Wilson (1888) 123 Pa. ig, 16 Atl. 36; Van Clief v. Vat
Vechten (1892) 13o N. Y. 571, :29 N. E. 107; Spence z. Ham (igoo) 163 N. Y.
220, 57 N. E. 412; Elliott v. Caldwell (1890) 43 Minn. 357, 45 N. W. 845; Cor-
nish &c. Co. v. Dairy Ass'n. (IOI) 82 Minn. 215, 84 N. W. 724; Drew v. Good-
hue (9o2) 74 Vt 436, 52 AtI. 971; Thompson v. Brown (I898) io6 Ia. 367,
76 N. W. 81g; Main v. Oien (i8gi) 47 Minn. 89, 49 N. W. 523; Ponce v. Smith
(1892) 84 Me. 266, 29 Atl. 854; Hathaway v. Lynn (1889) 75 Wis. 186, 43 N. W.
956; Desmond-Dunne Co. v. Friedman-Doscher Co. (i9oo) 162 N. Y. 486, 56
N. E. 995.
"Williams Mfg. Co. v. Standard Brass Co. (i899) 173 Mass. 356, 53 N. E.
862; Fire Alarm Co. v. Big Rapids (1889) 78 Mich. 67, 43 N. W. 1O3O.
If the satisfaction required is that of some third party, the court is much
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YALE LAW JOURNAL
whether there is any genuine contract in such a case;681 but the
doubt seems not to be well founded, for the state of the promisee's
Mnind is a fact to be ascertained by the jury on evidence introduced,
and the defendant is not privileged not to pay if the jury finds that he
was satisfied. His denial of satisfaction would not be conclusive. 67
The doubt is well grounded, however, if the defendant's promise is
merely to perform if he shall desire to do so, or if the defendant's
own expression of satisfaction is made conclusive.6
In construing contracts where the plaintiff has promised personal
satisfaction a distinction is drawn between those where performance
must be measured and judged by standards of personal taste, feeling,
or sentiment, and those where the determination depends merely upon
market value or mechanical fitness and utility. In the former class.
if the plaintiff promised to satisfy the defendant, the latter's personal
satisfaction is generally held to be a condition precedent to his duty
to pay even though it is not so described in words by the parties.,"
This is because there really are no standards by which the court or
jury can measure performance, and in the absence of satisfaction the
performance is not regarded as "substantial." In the latter class,
personal satisfaction will never be held to be a condition precedent
unless it is clearly so described, and the court will be not unlikely even
then to substitute the satisfaction of a reasonable man. 0 The decision
will depend in part on whther the plaintiff will suffer a heavy loss or
the defendant receive unjust enrichment in case personal satisfaction
more likely to hold that his personal satisfaction is a condition. Butler v. Tucker
(1840, N. Y.) 24 Wend. 446.
'Folliard v. Wallace (18o7, N. Y.) 2 Johns. 395; Duplex Safety Boiler Co.
v. Garden (1886) ioi N. Y. 387, 4 N. E. 749.
'*Silsby Mfg. Co. v. Chico (1885, C. C. D. Cal.) 24 Fed. 893; Hartford Sor-
ghum Co. v. Brush (1871) 43 Vt. 528. So in McCartney v. Badovinac (1916)
62 Colo. 76, i6o Pac. 19o, where the defendant hired a detective to investigate
charges as to the theft of a diamond and promised to pay $5oo "in the event
that he shall determine the questions to the satisfaction of the said McCartney,"
it was held that he must pay the amount when the detective proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the promisor's wife had stolen the diamond in spite of
the fact that the promisor professed dissatisfaction.
"Hunt v. Livermore (1828, Mass.) 5 Pick. 395; Hawkins v. Graham (1889)
149 Mass. 284, 21 N. E. 312; Great Northern Ry. v. Witham (1873) L. R. 9
C. P. 16.
'Pennington v. Howland (1898) 21 R. I. 65, 41 At. 891 (portrait); Gibson
v. Cranage (1878) 39 Mich. 49 (portrait); Zaleski v. Clark (1876) 44 Conn.
218 (bust) ; Brown v. Foster (1873) 113 Mass. 136 (suit of clothes) ; Koehler
v. Buhl (1893) 94 Mich. 496, 57 N. W. 157 (personal services); Crawford v.
Pub. Co. (igoo) 163 N. Y. 404, 57 N. E. I6 (newspaper contributor).
"' See Magee v. Scott &c. Co. (I899) 78 Minn. ii, 8o N. W. 781; Folliard v.
Wallace (i8o7, N. Y.) 2 Johns. 395 (express condition of satisfaction with title
to land).
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is held to be a condition. An increasing liberality is to be noted in
allowing a quasi-contractual recovery by a plaintiff in default, but
this is available only where the defendant has. received value and not
where the plaintiff will merely suffer a heavy loss.
In a sale of goods upon a contract that the goods may be returned
if not satisfactory to the buyer, personal satisfaction is clearly a condi-
tion if the article is one involving personal taste.71 It is also usually
held that if the contract makes the buyer the sole judge he may return
the articles even if they do not involve strictly a matter of personal
taste, at least in all cases where he carn place the seller in statu quo."
When the consideration furnished is of such a nature that its value
will be largely or wholly lost to the one furnishing it unless paid for,
and it is not a matter that ordinarily involves merely personal taste,
the courts are strongely inclined to hold that the satisfaction of a
reasonable man is the only condition.73 But if the plaintiff's work and
material are to result in something involving personal taste or comfort
the genuine dissatisfaction of the promisor will defeat a recovery.
7 4 "
OFFER, OPTION, AND CONDITIONAL CONTRACT75
An offer may be defined as an act of one party whereby he confers a
power upon another to create contractual relations between them by
another act called acceptance. This power is revocable by the offeror
at any time prior to acceptance (or perhaps prior to the doing of some
substantial act that constitutes a part of the specified acceptance). As
long as it is thus revocable, the offeror having both the power and the
'McClure v. Briggs (1886) 58 Vt 82, 2 Atl. 583 (organ); McCarren v.
McNulty (1856, Mass.) 7 Gray, 139 (bookcase); Fechteler v. Whittemore (igio)
2o5 Mass. 6, 91 N. E. 155 (satisfaction to a reasonable man held sufficient).
Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Thorp (1888, C. C. E. D. Mich.) 36 Fed. 414
(printing-press); Walter A. Wood & Co. v. Smith (188o) So Mich. 565 (har-
vesting machine); Goodrich v. Van Nortwick (1867) 43 Ill. 445 (fanning mill) ;
Aiken v. Hyde (1868) 99 Mass. 183 (gas generator) ; Singerly v. Thayer (1885)
io8 Pa. 291, 2 Atl. 23o (passenger elevator) ; Exhaust Ventilator Co. v. Chicago
&c. R. (1886) 66 Wis. 218, 28 N. W. 343 (exhaust fans).
"'Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden (1886) ioi N. Y. 387, 4 N. E. 749
(express condition disregarded) ; Sloan v. Hayden (1872) iio Mass. 141; Haw-
kins v. Graham (z889) 149 Mass. 284, 21 N. E. 312; Doll v. Noble (1889) I16
N. Y. 230, 23 N. E. 406; Hummel v. Stern (igoo, N. Y.) 21 App. Div. 544, 48
N. Y. Supp. 528, aff'd 164 N. Y. 603, 58 N. E. io88; Lockwood Mfg. Co. v. Mason
Regulator Co. (19o3) 183 Mass. 25, 66 N. E. 420; Keeler v. Clifford (1897) 165
Ill. 544, 46 N. E. 248.
" 4Adams Radiator & Boiler Works v. Schnader (1893) 155 Pa. 394, 26 Atl.
745; Schmand v. Jandorf (1913) 175 Mich. 88, 14o N. W. 996 (skilled service).
"For previous discussions by the present writer see (9,7) 26 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, i69, Offer and Acceptance, and (1914) 23 ibid. 641, Option Contracts.
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privilege of destroying the power of the offeree, we do not say that
there is a contract.
An option is always an offer, usually an offer to buy or to sell
property, and always creates a power in the option holder. But some
options are irrevocable and are then often described as "binding
options." This means that the parties have created in the option
holder (the offeree) a power accompanied by an immunity from revo-
cation, and in the option giver (the offeror) the correlative liability to
acceptance and disability to revoke. It does not mean that the option
giver has merely a duty not to revoke, for breach of which he must
pay damages. although such a duty may exist; it means that he has
no power (that is, has a disability) to destroy the option holder's power.
As previously shown, 7 such power and liability are frequently called
"conditional right" and "conditional duty." To create such an option
(or irrevocable offer) as this, either a sealed instrument or a considera-
tion is necessary. For these reasons, a binding option may always be
properly described as a contract. Observe that the acts of two persons
are always necessary to create a binding option; there must be an offer
and acceptance by the offeree. A mere offer is always the act of one
person alone.
A binding option is always one sort of a conditional contract; but
the latter is the more inclusive term. It includes any agreement that
creates conditional rights and duties as heretofore explained, even
though no one is given a power. Where for a consideration A has
promised B to pay $ioo after his ship comes in, or after any other
event not the voluntary act of B, no power is created in B and he has
no option. Instead, B is said to have a conditional right and A is
under a conditional duty. This, too, requires the voluntary acts of
two persons, an offer and an acceptance, with either a sealed instru-
ment or a consideration.
The terms contract and option are loosely used. The specific legal
relations connoted by these terms vary with each individual case. The
only safety lies in an analysis of these complex concepts into their
constituent simpler concepts-right, power, privilege, immunity. Clear
thinking and correct decision require this analysis.
PROOF OF CONDITIONS AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
When a written instrument containing words that are on their face
unconditional, is delivered, can it be shown that the maker did not
intend to create immediate rights, powers, privileges or immunities,
but only conditional ones? Is parol evidence admissible to show that
some fact operating as a "condition" must exist prior to any imme-
"' See note 5, supra.
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CONDITIONS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
diate right? Does not such parol evidence contradict or vary the terms
of the writing? There is no doubt that under these circumstances
parol evidence is admissible.
Such evidence does not necessarily show that there is no contract
at all, nor does it show that there is not yet any completed "legal act."
77
There may be a parol contract between the parties, completed so far
as to be irrevocable and creating either conditional or unconditional
rights and duties. The operative facts all lie in parol; they are the
acts of offer and acceptance, the parol expressions of agreement.
Parol evidence must prove them and is admissible to prove all of them.
including pirol conditions. Such parol expressions are completed
"legal acts" with the customary operative effect.
The mere existence of a written instrument, however, is never per se
an operative fact; unaccompanied by words or other acts expressing
some intention, it creates no legal relations. The mere writing and
'The use of the term "legal act" in Wigmore on Evidence, see. 2404 et seq.
seems highly objectionable. His reason for the rule allowing parol evidence to
show that a document has been delivered subject to some parol condition is
that there has been no completed legal act. "The act must be final in its uttere
ance. It does not come into existence as an act until the whole has been uttered.
As almost all important transactions are preceded by tentative and preparatory
negotiations and drafts, the problem is to ascertain whether and when the utter-
ance was final; because until there has been some finality of utterance, there
is no act"
This analysis is unfortunate in two respects. The word "act" is used to
include a large number of operative facts diverse in character, and secondly the
implication is suggested that prior to the "final utterance" the preliminary facts
and events have no legally operative effect Austin's definition of "act" is
much to be preferred. "The bodily movements -which immediately follow our
desires of them are acts." i Jurisp. 42. "External acts are such motions of
the body as are consequent upon determinations of the wuill." Ibid. 366. See
adopting this usage, with like quotations from Justices Markby and Holmes,
Professor Walter W. Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law
(1917) 26 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 645. In accordance with Austin's simple and
scientific definition of "act," the document is not an act at all, or any part of an
act Likewise, the condition upon which the document was to become operative
may not be an act; and it is almost never an act of the person executing the
instrument. It certainly should not be described as his "utterance." The
occurrence of the condition, therefore, is not the completion of any act on the
part of the contractor; nor are his preliminary acts inoperative to create new
legal relations,-instead, they are themselves completed dcts and each very often
operates to create new powers and privileges and even Tights and duties. The
document may not yet be an operative fact in itself, and therefore does not
prevent the preliminary acts and events from having their customary legal
operation.
Wigmore's usage of the term "legal act" is followed by Kales, Considerations
on the Art of Interpreting Writings (1g18) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 33, and by
Aigler, Is a Contract Necessary to Create an Effective Escrow? (1918) 16 MIcH.
L, REV. 580.
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signing of a document do not make it an operative fact; neither does
the handing of it to another person to keep safely for the writer or to
read and examine. The accompanying acts of the maker must always
be proved in order to show what the legal operation of the instrument
is, for these acts determine its legal operation. If A hands it to C
saying: "Keep this for me," the document is not an operative fact.
Its delivery, however, is such a fact, for it creates the rights and duties
of bailment. If A says: "Deliver this to Bon payment of $5000," the
delivery to C is again an operative fact; as before, it is a bailment, and
along with the accompanying words it creates a power in C to make
the document itself an operative fact by a new delivery to B. Prior
to such new delivery the document is not an operative fact at all. In
order that a written instrument may exclude any parol evidence what-
ever, it must be shown by other parol evidence that the parties acted in
such a way as to express an intention to make the instrument an opera-
tive fact. If parol evidence is necessary to show that it ever had any
operative effect, it is surely admissible to show that it never had any
operative effect And wherever the instrument is not itself an opera-
tive fact, parol evidence is always admissible to show what the really
operative facts were and how they operate. Rights may be shown to
be conditional irrespective of the terms of the inoperative instrument;
parol terms can be proved in contradiction to the terms of such an
instrument. Parol evidence becomes inadmissible to contradict or vary
a written instrument only after other parol evidence has shown that
the parties have constituted that instrument as in itself an operative
fact. 8
In Pym v. Campbell,"9 a writing, apparently complete and properly
signed, was delivered to the plaintiff, who offered it in evidence. The
defendant was allowed to prove that it was delivered to be effective
only in case A should approve of the invention that was the subject
of sale, and that A did not approve. Nothing was said about A's
approval in the writing itself. Erle, J. said: "If it be proved that in
fact the paper was signed with the express intention that it should not
be an agreement, the other party cannot fix it as an agreement upon
those signing. The distinction in point of law is that evidence to vary
the terms of an agreement in writing is not admissible, but evidence
to show that there is not an agreement at all is admissible."
Some variation may exist here in the use of the word "agreement";
but it is clear that in its proper sense there was in fact an agreement
in this case, there was a valid contract, and there were numerous com-
pleted "legal acts." The parol evidence shows that there had been
"' See Reed v. Reed (igi8, Me.) io4 Ati. 227.
"' (i856, Q. B.) 6 E. & B. 370,, said by Wigmore, Evid. sec. 24io, to be the
leading case.
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acts of offer and acceptance indicating a true meeting of minds, that
these acts had the same legal operation as in the making of any other
contract, and that there was a valid contract made.80 It showed
further that the terms of the contract as made were not identical with
those written on the paper, and it most certainly contradicts and varies
the terms of the paper. It i! permitted to do this, however, for the
reason that the paper itself is not yet an operative fact at all, and it is
not an operative fact because the parties have in fact agreed that it
shall not be. The rights of each party under the existing parol con-
tract are conditional rights; the approval of A was made a condition
precedent to the existence of immediate and instantly enforceable rights
and duties. Had the formal document ever been agreed upon as the
complete and final memorial of their agreement, it would then itself be
an operative fact; the parol evidence rule would have caused it to
operate to exclude proof that A!s approval was to be a condition.8"
It has been sometimes supposed that the parol evidence rule will
permit proof of a condition precedent, but will exclude proof of a
condition subsequent. Thus in a case holding parol evidence admis-
sible to show that a deed placed in the hands of the grantee was to be
ineffective until all the heirs signed, 2 the court said: "but where the
mutually understood intention was to give title immediately on delivery,
subject to the condition subsequent that other heirs should sign, the
non-performance of the condition cannot be set up to defeat the
absolute terms of the deed. Of course, a condition subsequent is not
effective." As shown heretofore, precedent and subsequent are rela-
tive terms. In the present connection it is correct to say that any fact
can be proved by parol if it was agreed upon as a condition precedent
to the document's becoming in itself an operative fact; but if it was
not precedent to that, it cannot be proved in variance of the instrument,
even though it may have been orally agreed upon as a condition pre-
cedent to the existence of instant rights and duties. Thus if A agrees
to pay for a chattel on condition that X shall approve, the approval of
X is a condition precederit to the duty to pay; and yet this condition
could not be proved by parol in case A has delivered a written docu-
'See in accord, T. Baty, Loan and Hire, 6.
'Other similar cases are Wallis v. Littell (1861) 11 C. B. N. S. 369 (assign-
ment of a lease conditional on consent of landlord) ; Stanley v. White (1896)
i6o Ill. 6o5, 43 N. E. 729; Wilson v. Powers (1881) 131 Mass. 539 (payee of
note gave written extension, on the parol condition that the sureties should
consent) ; Robertson v. Rowell (1893) 158 Mass. 94, 32 N. E. 898 (note delivered
to payee on parol condition that X should indorse) Burke v. Dulaney (1894) 153
U. S. 228, 14 Sup. Ct. 816; Burns v. Doyle (1899) 71 Conn. 742, 43 Atl. 483;
Chipinan v. Tucker (1875) 38 Wis. 43; Bowser v. Fountain (915) r28 Minn.
198, 15o N. W. 795. Like other conditions this kind of a condition can be waived.
California R. G. Assn. v. Abbott (1911) x6o Cal. 6ol, 6o6, 117 Pac. 767.
' Stanley v. White, supra.
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tive terms. In the present connection it is correct to say that any fact
can be proved by parol if it was agreed upon as a condition precedent
to the document's becoming in itself an operative fact; but if it as
not precedent to that, it cannot be proved in variance of the instru ent,
even though it may have been orally agreed upon as a condition pre-
cedent to the existence of instant rights and duties. Thu~ if agrees
to pay for a chattel on condition that X shall approve, the approval of
X is a condition precedent to the duty to pay; and yet this condition
could not be proved by parol in case A has delivered a ritten docu-
ro See in accord, T. Baty, Loan and ire, 6.
61 Other similar cases are Wallis v. Littell (1861) II C. B. N. S. 369 (assign-
ment of a lease conditional on consent of landlord) ; Stanley v. hite (18g6)
160 Ill. 605, 43 N. E. 729; Wilson v. Powers (1881) 131 ass. 539 (payee of
note gave written extension, on the parol condition that the sureties should
consent) ; Robertson v. Rowell (1893) 158 Mass. 94. 32 N. E. 8g8 (note delivered
to payee on parol condition that X should indorse) Burke v. Dulaney (1894) 153
U. S.228, 14 Sup. Ct. 816; Burns v. Doyle (1899) 71 Conn. 742, 43 Atl. 483;
Chipman v. Tucker (1875) 38 Wis. 43; Bowser v. Fountain (1915) 128 inn.
198, 150 N. W. 795. Like other conditions this kind of a condition can be aived.
Califomia R. G. Ass,~. v. Abbott (19II) 160 ~al. 601, 606, II7 Pac. 767.
.. Stanley v. hite, supra.
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ment referring to no such condition, with the intention of making the
document instantly operative. The non-approval by X would indeed be
subsequent to the delivery of an operative document; but the approval
of X, if it could be proved at all, would be a condition precedent to
any enforceable duty to pay. Whenever the document has not been
agreed upon and delivered as in itself an operative fact, it excludes
no parol proof whatever, of facts that operate either as conditions pre-
cedent or as conditions subsequent.
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